After decades of moves towards trade liberalization, trade restrictions, especially tariffs, are back in vogue. The United States has raised tariffs on numerous products, paralyzed the World Trade Organization’s dispute-settlement system, and engaged in a trade war with China. The continuation of adversarial actions seems assured, with both political parties indicating interest in higher tariffs to defend against imports from various countries and ongoing calls to “decouple” from China.

Against this backdrop of rising trade tensions and weakening international legal constraints, I examine the demand for such defensive trade measures and the domestic administrative processes that result in them. I adopt a bottom-up perspective that trains attention on the actors that engage these processes through the enforcement of “administrative trade remedies,” which I define broadly to include any domestic law that aims to defend domestic industries against imports and is administered by an administrative agency, e.g., antidumping duties or Section 232 national-security trade actions. Rather than focus on Congress or the President, this view better appreciates the role of firms, workers, and lawyers in mobilizing administrative agencies to enforce, and thereby make, trade law.

I draw on over forty interviews with those involved in administrative trade-remedy processes and original datasets of agency investigations to describe how those who seek and benefit from tariffs choose among a toolkit of domestic remedies. Although tools with greater presidential involvement in the decisionmaking process are receiving increased attention, I find that private actors remain actively engaged in the enforcement of administrative trade remedies, and they continue to prefer the antidumping and countervailing duty process because of its relative insulation from politics (especially the President) and resulting predictability and durability.

A bottom-up view of administrative trade remedies in the United States contributes first to our understanding of trade lawmaking and policy. In addition to highlighting the continued relevance of focusing on private actors and agency processes, the premium that relevant actors place on a process’s perceived distance from politics and predictability helps explain the continuing popularity of such a scheme, as well as the value of consistent agency practice during a time of high political polarization and volatility. This approach can also travel to other countries, where the use of defensive measures is similarly on the rise, or to other areas of U.S. trade law. Second, I contribute to scholarship that seeks to “normalize” trade law. The mixed public-private nature of the trade-remedies enforcement scheme and interviewees’ discussions of the pros and cons of administrative procedures illustrate the benefits of bringing research on “ordinary” areas of domestic law to bear on trade law, and vice versa.

• Current draft (v. March 2025) available upon request

One front in today’s battle to define the scope of the administrative state concerns the authority, status, and future of its 10,000-plus administrative adjudicators. Decisions by federal courts and the executive branch to increase the dependence of administrative adjudicators on the executive have sparked strong reactions from observers, with many advocating for measures to increase adjudicator “independence.” But who should administrative adjudicators be independent of, which ought to be independent, and why?

Calls for administrative adjudicator independence are not new. This Article draws on primary documents produced by private actors, congressional decisionmakers, and federal executive agents to present a political legal history of legislative proposals between 1929 and 1949 to understand whether, how, and why different actors sought to insulate administrative adjudicators from their agencies or the President. Leading up to and following the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, politicians and interested citizens advanced proposals to increase the independence of the individuals who conducted hearings and served as factfinders in administrative agencies. Then, like now, observers debated administrative adjudicator independence in the context of discussions about the power of administrative agencies. The loudest supporters of independence were anti-New Dealers trying to halt and reverse the growth of administrative power, who were joined by a subset of legal professionals interested in using law to check its operation. These critics attempted to “judicialize” administrative adjudication by increasing the resemblance of administrative adjudicators to the federal judiciary.

What does this history teach? First, it illustrates how actors past and present deploy seemingly apolitical terms like judicial values, independence, or administrative procedure to obtain substantive political ends. Indeed, such terms can take on different meanings at different times, perhaps varying with views of the federal judiciary and active government, the policies and political strength of the President, the issues decided by administrative agencies, or the types of claimants subject to adjudication. Second, it highlights how early supporters of administrative agencies emphasized the diversity among administrative adjudicators, while opponents grouped them together to collectively limit their authority. Today, rather than pursuing one-size-fits-all reforms, I suggest that different rules should apply to different administrative adjudicators depending on the questions and claimants involved. Decisions about ratemaking or regulatory enforcement differ from individualized determinations whether citizens qualify for government benefits or licenses. Claims by business interests might be treated differently from those by more vulnerable groups, such as disability-benefits recipients or noncitizens at risk of removal. In any event, when making policy recommendations, reformers should begin by understanding who administrative adjudicators are and the functions they perform, an understanding that also underscores whether and how politics should animate arguments about adjudicator independence.

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This article provides a bottom-up view of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) though an empirical examination of how and why domestic lawyers are engaged in BRI investment and infrastructure projects. Drawing on an original dataset of biographical information of, and eleven semi-structured interviews with, lawyers identified by the state as “BRI and Cross-Border Legal Experts,” I examine these lawyers’ demographic characteristics, the knowledge they rely upon in their work, and their motivations. I find that China’s BRI lawyers work and speak in ways similar to cross-border lawyers from countries like the United States. At the same time, these state-adjacent professionals acknowledge the state’s heavy involvement in crafting the environment surrounding their work. Although these politics do not necessarily affect the technical aspects of their practice, many keep close tabs on BRI policies, some are involved in policy reform efforts, and most express pride in what a successful BRI might mean for China’s future.

In addition to contributing to sociolegal scholarship interested in the legal profession’s role in (re-)crafting dominant global scripts, I suggest that the day-to-day work of legal professionals serves as a barometer of the intentions and successes of Chinese state policy. For now, my portrait of China’s BRI lawyers suggests that they largely adhere to the existing script’s understanding of norms and best practices, and see their work as complementary to the existing system rather than subversive. Nonetheless, I urge continued focus on BRI lawyers and the other on-the-ground actors that make China’s foreign policy a reality.

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This article complicates the conventional wisdom that Chinese lawyers are either politically liberal activists or apolitical hired guns by training our attention on the group of lawyers who choose to stand adjacent to the state and participate in governance. Through an examination of how and why winners of the state-sanctioned Outstanding Lawyer Award participate in politics, we illustrate how state-adjacent lawyers provide the state with information and persuade others to behave in ways the state considers appropriate. Although proximity to power affords some social and professional benefits, award winners are also motivated by a commitment to improving Chinese society. By highlighting the political role played by lawyers who serve as a bridge between state and society, we open the door to future research on the relationship between the state and professionals in other industries and countries, and call for continued attention to how inequality shapes opportunities for political participation in China.

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How do authoritarian states define and communicate notions of appropriate work conduct and professional excellence? This article examines three channels of communication used by the Chinese state to signal professional expectations to the bar: the bar exam, the administrative rules governing lawyers, and the state-sanctioned National Outstanding Lawyer Award. We find that China’s state narrative about “the good lawyer” celebrates lawyers willing to work closely with the authorities and asks more stringent critics to separate private beliefs from public behavior. In contrast to assumptions often made in research on authoritarian law, this article highlights how lawyers can participate in politics without opposing the regime and how much work goes into curating an appealing state strand of legal professionalism rather than relying on coercion alone. We end with a call for future work on “varieties of legal professionalism” to better understand which state signals are most visible and persuasive to different segments of the Chinese bar, as well as the conditions under which alternate ideas about professionalism gain traction.

• Awarded the 2021 Law and Society Association Article Prize
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We construct a database of federal appellate cases involving religious liberties decided between 2006 and 2015, expanding and improving an existing database covering up to 2005. The data are used to investigate the role of religion in judicial decision making. We find that Jewish judges are significantly more likely than their non-Jewish colleagues to favor claimants in religious liberties cases, but we find no significant effects for other minority religions. Our findings confirm previous findings in the literature, but we go a number of steps further than existing studies in uncovering the sources of Jewish judges’ influence. We conclude that the effect of Jewish judges comes through their increased concern for the separation of church and state—not through their heightened solicitude for the interests of religious minorities in practicing their religion or through preferential treatment of Jewish claimants. Further, our analysis of cases not involving religion shows that the pro-claimant effect of Jewish judges is attributable not to a general liberal attitude but to a particular secular concern for the separation of church and state. Finally, we are the first researchers to go beyond individual effects and investigate the panel effects of judges’ religious affiliation. Our findings in this regard have suggestive implications for identifying the mechanism of panel effects.

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